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PRECAUTIONARY SAVING OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE*
Edouard Challe and Xavier Ragot
We study the macroeconomic implications of time-varying precautionary savings within a general
equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, aggregate shocks and uninsurable idiosyncratic
unemployment risk. Our framework generates limited cross-sectional household heterogeneity as an
equilibrium outcome, thereby making it possible to analyse the role of precautionary saving over the
business cycle in an analytically tractable way. The time-series behaviour of aggregate consumption
generated by our model is closer to the data than that implied by the hand-to-mouth and
representative-agent models, and it is comparable to that produced by the Krusell and Smith (1998)
model.
How important are changes in precautionary asset accumulation for the propagation
of business cycle shocks? In this article, we attempt to answer this question by
constructing a tractable model of time-varying precautionary-saving behaviour driven
by countercyclical changes in unemployment risk. Because households are assumed to
be imperfectly insured against this risk, they respond to such changes by altering their
buffer stock of wealth. This in turn amplifies the consumption response to aggregate
shocks that affect unemployment.
Our motivation for investigating the role of precautionary saving over the business
cycle is based on earlier empirical evidence which points to a significant role for the
precautionary motive in explaining the accumulation and variation of wealth by
individuals over time. Empirical studies that focus on the cross-sectional dispersion of
wealth suggest that, all else equal, households facing higher income risk accumulate
more wealth or consume less, on average (Carroll, 1994; Carroll and Samwick, 1997,
1998; Engen and Gruber, 2001). This argument has been extended to the time-series
dimension by Carroll (1992), Gourinchas and Parker (2001), Parker and Preston
(2005) and, more recently, Carroll et al. (2012), who argue that changes in
precautionary wealth accumulation following countercyclical changes in income
volatility may substantially amplify fluctuations in aggregate consumption.1 We
construct a general equilibrium model in which the strength of the precautionary
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motive is explicitly related to the extent of unemployment risk, the main source of
income fluctuations for most households (at least at business cycle frequencies).
Methodologically, the novelty of our approach is to propose a class of heteroge-
neous-agent models with incomplete markets, borrowing constraints and both
aggregate and idiosyncratic labour income shocks that can be solved under exact
aggregation and rational expectations. More specifically, we outline a set of sufficient
conditions about preferences and the tightness of the borrowing constraint, under
which the model endogenously generates a cross-sectional distribution of wealth with a
limited number of states; exact aggregation directly follows. This makes the model
‘tractable’ in the sense that its dynamics can be summarised by a low-dimensional
dynamic system, the solution to which admits a simple state-space representation. This
approach makes it possible to derive analytical results and incorporate time-varying
precautionary saving into general equilibrium analysis using simple solution methods –
including linearisation and undetermined coefficient methods. In particular, our
analysis allows the derivation of a common asset-holding rule for employed households
facing incomplete insurance, possibly expressed in linear form, which explicitly
connects precautionary wealth accumulation to the risk of becoming unemployed.
Additionally, our model can be simulated with several – and possibly imperfectly
correlated – aggregate shocks with continuous support; we consider three such shocks
in our baseline specification (i.e. technology, job-finding and job-separation shocks).
Thus, our approach differs from that in traditional heterogeneous-agent models with
aggregate shocks a la Krusell and Smith (1998), which typically generate a full, time-
varying, cross-sectional distribution of wealth that every agent must forecast in order to
make their best intertemporal decisions. While we construct and simulate the simplest
version of our model with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity here, we emphasise
that its tractability can be exploited in many other contexts, for example when other
frictions (e.g. nominal rigidities, labour market frictions etc.) interact with incomplete
insurance.2
In order to isolate the precautionary motive in the determination of households’
savings, our general framework incorporates both patient ‘permanent-income’
consumers and impatient consumers who are imperfectly insured and may face
occasionally binding borrowing constraints. Aside from the baseline precautionary-
saving case just discussed, wherein impatient households hold a time-varying buffer-
stock of wealth in excess of the borrowing limit, our framework embodies two cases of
special interest: the representative-agent model and the hand-to-mouth model. The
representative-agent model arises in the limit of our incomplete-market model when
the economy becomes entirely populated by permanent-income consumers. The hand-
to-mouth model – a situation where impatient households face a binding borrowing
limit in every period – endogenously arises when the precautionary motive becomes
too weak to offset impatience, causing impatient households to consume their entire
income in every period.3 We link the strength of the precautionary motive – and thus
2 See McKay and Reis (2013) or Ravn and Sterk (2013) for recent analyses of the interactions of such
frictions with incomplete markets in the context of models with full cross-sectional heterogeneity.
3 In this case, our economy collapses to a two-agent one, like those studied by Becker and Foias (1987),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or Iacoviello (2005), for example.
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whether or not impatient households are ultimately willing to save – to the deep
parameters of the model, most notably the extent of unemployment risk, the
generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme and the tightness of the borrowing
constraint.
We then use our framework to identify and quantify the specific role of incomplete
insurance and precautionary wealth accumulation – as opposed to mere borrowing
constraints for example – in determining the volatility of aggregate consumption and
its co-movements with output. We thus calibrate the model to match the main features
of the cross-sectional distributions of wealth and non-durable consumption in the US
economy (in addition to the other usual quantities). Next, we feed the calibrated
model with aggregate shocks to productivity and labour market transition rates with
magnitude and joint behaviour that are directly estimated from post-war US data. We
then study their quantitative implications for a variety of aggregate and distributional
statistics. We find the time-series behaviour of aggregate consumption generated by
our baseline precautionary-savings model to be closer to the data than those implied by
the comparable hand-to-mouth and representative-agent models. To complete the
picture, we also compare the moments of interest implied by our baseline
precautionary-savings model with those generated by the full-fledged heterogeneous-
agent model of Krusell and Smith (1998, Section IV).
Our analysis differs from earlier attempts at constructing tractable models with
incomplete insurance, which typically restrict the stochastic processes for the
idiosyncratic shocks in ways that makes them ill-suited for the analysis of time-varying
unemployment risk. For example, Constantinides and Duffie (1996) study the asset-
pricing implications of an economy in which households are hit by uninsured
permanent income shocks. Heathcote et al. (2013) have generalised this approach by
looking at the case where households’ income is also affected by insurable transitory
shocks (Heathcote et al., 2008 and Braun and Nakajima, 2012). Toche (2005), and
more recently Carroll and Toche (2011), explicitly solve for households’ optimal
asset-holding rule in a partial-equilibrium economy where they face the risk of
permanently exiting the labour market. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) analyse
precautionary-saving behaviour in a model with trading frictions a la Lagos and
Wright (2005), showing that agents’ liquidity hoarding amplifies the impact of i.i.d.
(aggregate and idiosyncratic) productivity shocks. Relative to these models, ours
allows for stochastic transitions across labour market statuses, which implies that
individual income shocks are transitory (but persistent) and have a conditional
distribution that depends on the aggregate state. The model is thus fully consistent
with the flow approach to the labour market and can be evaluated using direct
evidence on the cyclical movements in labour market flows. Our approach is also
related to Vermylen (2006), who shows how to solve an incomplete-market model with
idiosyncratic shocks by linearising it around the steady state of its complete-market
counterpart. In contrast, our model can be formulated nonlinearly and can
accommodate aggregate shocks.
Section 1 presents the model. In Section 2, we introduce the parameter restrictions
that make our model tractable by endogenously limiting the dimensionality of the
cross-sectional distribution of wealth. Section 3 calibrates the model and compares its
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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quantitative implications to the data and to alternative theoretical benchmarks. Section
4 concludes.
1. The Model
The model features a closed economy with a representative firm and a continuum of
households uniformly distributed along the unit interval. All households rent out
labour and capital to the firm, which produces the unique (final) good in the
economy. Markets are competitive but there are frictions in the financial markets, as we
describe further below.
1.1. Households
Every household i is endowed with one unit of labour, which is supplied inelastically to
the representative firm if the household is employed. All households are subject to
idiosyncratic changes in their labour market status between ‘employment’ and
‘unemployment’. Employed households earn a competitive market wage (net of social
contributions)while unemployedhouseholds earn afixedunemployment benefit di > 0.
We assume that households can be of two types, impatient and patient, distributed
on the subintervals [0, Ω] and (Ω, 1] respectively, with Ω 2 [0, 1). While not necessary
for the construction of our equilibrium with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity, the
introduction of patient households will allow us to generate a substantial degree of
cross-sectional wealth dispersion since they will end up holding a large fraction of total
wealth in equilibrium. The unemployment risk faced by households is summarised by
two probabilities: the probability that a household employed at date t  1 will be
unemployed at date t (the job-loss probability st) and the probability that a household
unemployed at date t  1 will remain unemployed at date t (i.e. 1f t, where f t is the
job-finding probability). The law of motion for employment is:
nt ¼ ð1 nt1Þft þ ð1 stÞnt1: (1)
1.1.1. Impatient households
Impatient householdsmaximise E0
P1
t¼0ðbI ÞtuI ðcit Þ, i 2 [0, Ω], where cit is (nondurable)
consumption by household i at date t, uI() is the period utility function satisfying
uI
0
() > 0 and uI 0 0() ≤ 0, and bI 2 (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. We restrict
the set of assets that impatient households have access to in two ways. First, we assume
that they cannot issue assets contingent on their employment status but only enjoy the
(partial) insurance provided by the public unemployment insurance scheme. Second,
we assume that these households face an (exogenous) borrowing limit in that their
asset wealth cannot fall below l, where l ≥ 0. We let eit denote household i’s
employment status at date t, with eit ¼ 1 if the household is employed and 0 otherwise.
The budget and non-negativity constraints faced by an impatient household are:
ait þ cit ¼ eit wIt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 eit ÞdI þ Rtait1; (2)
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cit  0; ait   l; (3)
where ait represents the household’s holdings of claims to the capital stock at the end
of date t, Rt is the ex post-gross return on these claims, w
I
t is the real wage for impatient
households, dI is the unemployment benefit enjoyed by these households and wIt st is a
social contribution paid by the employed to finance the unemployment insurance
scheme. The Euler condition for impatient households is:
uI 0ðcit Þ ¼ bIEt ½uI 0ðcitþ1ÞRtþ1 þ uit ; (4)
where uit is the Lagrange coefficient associated with the borrowing constraint
ait   l, with uit [ 0 if the constraint is binding and uit ¼ 0 otherwise. Condition
(4), together with the initial asset holdings ai1, as well as the optimality conditions
limn!1 Et ½bItþnaitþnuI 0ðcitþnÞ ¼ 0 and uitðait þ lÞ ¼ 0, fully characterise the asset
holdings of impatient households.
1.1.2. Patient households
Patient households maximise E0
P1
t¼0ðbP ÞtuP ðcit Þ, i 2 (Ω, 1], where bP 2 (bI, 1), uP()
is a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function over [0,∞), and where
rP(c)uP0 0(c)c/uP0(c). Unlike impatient households, patient households have com-
plete access to asset markets, including the full set of Arrow–Debreu securities and loan
contracts.4 Hence, patient households collectively behave like a large representative
‘family’ of permanent-income consumers in which the family head ensures an equal
marginal utility of wealth for all its members (Merz, 1995). Since consumption is the
only argument in the period utility function, equal marginal utility of wealth implies
equal consumption. Hence, we can write the budget constraint of the family as:
CPt þ APt ¼ RtAPt1 þ ð1 XÞ½ntwPt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 ntÞdP ; (5)
where CPt (≥ 0) and APt denote the consumption and end-of-period asset holdings of
the family (both of which must be divided by 1  Ω to find the per-family member
analogues) and wPt and d
P are the real wage and unemployment benefit for patient
households. The Euler condition for patient households is given by:
uP 0½CPt =ð1 XÞ ¼ bPEtfuP 0½CPtþ1=ð1 XÞRtþ1g: (6)
This condition, the terminal condition limn!1 Et ½ðbP ÞtþnAPtþnuP 0ðCPtþn=ð1 XÞ ¼ 0
and the initial asset holdings AP1 fully characterise the optimal consumption path of
patient households.
4 Patient households will be more wealthy than impatient households in equilibrium – and a lot more so
when we calibrate the model to match the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in the US. Under a fixed
participation cost to trading Arrow–Debreu securities (as in, e.g. Mengus and Pancrazi, 2012), we expect
households holding more wealth (patient households here) to be more willing to buy insurance, all else
equal. Quantitatively, the results in Krusell and Smith (1998) illustrate that the behavior of wealthy agents
facing incomplete markets and borrowing constraints is almost indistinguishable from that of fully insured
agents.
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1.2. Production
The representative firm produces output, Yt, out of capital, Kt, and the units of effective
labour supplied by households. We let nIt and n
P
t denote the firm’s use of impatient
and patient households’ labour input. We then define Yt ¼ ztGðKt ;nIt þ jnPt Þ as the
aggregate production function, where j > 0 is the relative efficiency of patient
households’ labour (with the efficiency of impatient households’ labour normalised to
one); fztg1t¼0 is a stochastic aggregate productivity process with mean z=1; and where G
(, ) exhibits positive, decreasing marginal products and constant returns to scale
(CRS). As will become clear in Section 3, the introduction of an efficiency premium
for patient households (i.e. j > 1) raises their labour income share, which is necessary
to match the empirical cross-sectional consumption dispersion (for any plausible level
of wealth dispersion). With kt  Kt=ðnIt þ jnPt Þ and g(kt)G(kt,1), we have
Yt ¼ ztðnIt þ jnPt Þg ðktÞ. The optimality condition for firms is then given by:
ztg
0ðktÞ ¼ Rt  1þ m; (7)
where m 2 [0, 1] is the depreciation rate. The optimal demands for the two labour
types in a perfectly competitive labour market must satisfy ztG2ðKt ;nIt þ jnPt Þ ¼
wIt ¼ wPt =j, where wIt is the real wage per unit of effective labour.
1.3. Market Clearing
By the law of large numbers and the fact that all households face identical transition
rates in the labour market, the equilibrium numbers of impatient and patient
households working in the representative firm are nIt ¼ Xnt and nPt ¼ ð1 XÞnt ,
respectively. Consequently, effective labour is nIt þ jnPt ¼ ½Xþ ð1 XÞjnt and the
capital stock is Kt = [Ω + (1  Ω)j]ntkt. Moreover, by the CRS assumption, the price of
one unit of effective labour is wIt ¼ zt ½g ðktÞ  ktg 0ðktÞ. Now, let Ftð~a; eÞ denote the
measure at date t of impatient households with beginning-of-period asset wealth ~a and
employment status e, with atð~a; eÞ and ctð~a; eÞ the corresponding policy functions for
assets and consumption. Market clearing for claims to the capital stock requires that:
APt1 þ X
X
e¼0;1
Z þ1
~a¼l
at1ð~a; eÞdFt1ð~a; eÞ ¼ ½Xþ ð1 XÞjntkt ; (8)
where the left-hand side is total asset holdings by all households at the end of date t1
and the right-hand side is the demand for capital by the representative firm at date t.
Clearing of the goods market requires:
CPt þ X
X
e¼0;1
Z þ1
~a¼l
ctð~a; eÞdFtð~a; eÞ þ It ¼ zt ½Xþ ð1 XÞjntg ðktÞ; (9)
where the left-hand side includes the consumption of all households as well as aggregate
investment, It = [Ω + (1 Ω)j][nt+1kt+1 (1 m)ntkt], and the right-hand side is output.
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Finally, we require the unemployment insurance scheme to be balanced:
stnt ½XwIt þ ð1 XÞwPt  ¼ ð1 ntÞ½XdI þ ð1 XÞdP ; (10)
where total unemployment contributions (left-hand side) equal total unemployment
benefits (right-hand side).
DEFINITION 1. An equilibrium is defined as sequences of
(i) household decisions fCPt ; cit ;APt ; aitg1t¼0,
(ii) the firm’s capital per effective labour unit fktg1t¼0 and
(iii) aggregate variables fnt ;wIt ;Rt ; stg1t¼0 such that conditions (4) and (6)–(10) are
satisfied, given the forcing sequences fft ; st ; ztg1t¼0 and the initial wealth distribution
ðAp1; ai1; Þi2½0;X:
2. Equilibrium with Limited Cross-sectional Heterogeneity
Dynamic general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and borrowing
constraints usually generate a cross-sectional distribution of wealth with a large
number of states. This is because individual wealth is determined by one’s entire
history of idiosyncratic shocks (Aiyagari, 1994; Krusell and Smith, 1998). In this article,
we make specific assumptions about impatient households’ period utility and the
tightness of the borrowing constraint. These assumptions ensure that the cross-
sectional distribution of wealth has a finite number of wealth states as an equilibrium
outcome. As a result, the economy is characterised by a finite number of heteroge-
neous agents whose behaviour can be aggregated exactly, thereby making it possible to
represent the model’s dynamics via a standard (small-scale) dynamic system. In the
remainder of the article, we focus on the simplest equilibrium, which involves exactly
two possible wealth states for impatient households. However, we show in the online
Appendix that this approach can be generalised to construct tractable equilibria with
any finite number of wealth states.
2.1. Assumptions and Conjectured Equilibrium
Let us first assume that the instant utility function of impatient households, uI(c), is
(i) continuous, increasing, and differentiable over [0, +∞);
(ii) strictly concave with local relative risk aversion coefficient rI(c) = cuI 0 0(c)/
uI
0
(c) > 0 over [0, c], where c is an exogenous, positive threshold and
(iii) linear with slope g > 0 over (c, +∞) (see Figure 1).
This utility function, which is an extreme form of decreasing relative risk aversion,
implies that high-consumption (i.e. relatively wealthy) impatient households do not
mind moderate consumption fluctuations – as long as the implied optimal consump-
tion level says inside (c, +∞) – but dislike substantial consumption drops – those that
would cause consumption to fall inside the [0, c] interval.
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Given this utility function, we derive our equilibrium with limited cross-sectional
heterogeneity by construction; we first guess the general form of the solution and verify
ex-post that the set of conditions under which the conjectured equilibrium was derived
prevails in equilibrium. Our first conjecture is that an employed impatient household
is sufficiently wealthy for its chosen consumption level to lie above c, while an
unemployed, impatient household chooses a consumption level below c. In other
words, we are constructing an equilibrium in which the following condition holds:
Condition 1 : 8i 2 ½0;X; eit ¼ 1) cit [ c; eit ¼ 0) cit  c: (11)
As we show shortly, one implication of this utility function and of the ranking of
consumption levels is that employed households fear unemployment. Consequently,
they engage in ex ante precautionary-saving behaviour in order to limit (without being
able to fully eliminate) the associated rise in marginal utility.
The second feature of the equilibrium we are constructing is that the borrowing
constraint in (1) is binding for all unemployed, impatient households:
Condition 2 : 8i 2 ½0;X; eit ¼ 0) u0ðcit Þ[ Et ½bI u0ðcitþ1ÞRtþ1 and ait ¼ l: (12)
Equations (11) and (12) have direct implications for the optimal asset holdings of
employed households. By construction, a household that is employed at date t has asset
wealth ait Rtþ1 at the beginning of date t + 1. If the household falls into unemployment
at date t + 1, then the borrowing constraint becomes binding and the household
liquidates all assets. This implies that the household enjoys consumption:
citþ1 ¼ dI þ lþ ait Rtþ1 (13)
and marginal utility uI 0ðdI þ lþ aitþ1Rtþ1Þ.
cc*
cue
cee
cuu
u(c)
Concave Linear (with Slope   )
ceu
η
Fig 1. Instant Utility Function of Impatient Households, uI(c)
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There are now two cases to differentiate between, depending on whether or not this
household faces a binding borrowing constraint at date t (i.e. when the household is
still employed). If it does not, then ait [  l in (13), meaning that the household has
formed a buffer of precautionary asset wealth in excess of the borrowing limit when
still employed (with the buffer being of size ait þ l[ 0). If it does, then ait ¼ l in (13)
so that citþ1 ¼ dI  lðRtþ1  1Þ and the household will have consumed its entire (wage
and asset) income at date t.
2.1.1. The precautionary-saving case
If the borrowing constraint does not bind at date t, then ait [  l and the following
Euler condition must hold at that date:
g ¼ bIEtf½ð1 stþ1Þgþ stþ1uI 0ðdI þ lþ aitRtþ1ÞRtþ1g: (14)
The left-hand side is the current marginal utility of this household, which is
equal to g under condition (11). The right-hand side is expected, discounted
future marginal utility, with marginal utility at date t + 1 being broken into the
two possible employment statuses that this household may experience at that
date, weighted by their probabilities of occurrence. If the household stays
employed at date t + 1, which occurs with probability 1  st+1, it enjoys marginal
utility g (by (11)); if the household falls into unemployment, which occurs with
probability st+1, assets are liquidated (by (12)) and the household enjoys marginal
utility uI 0ðdI þ lþ aitRtþ1Þ. Since (14) pins down ait as a function of aggregate
variables only (i.e. st+1 and Rt+1), asset holdings are symmetric across employed
households:
8i 2 ½0;X; eit ¼ 1) ait ¼ at : (15)
To get further insight into how unemployment risk affects precautionary wealth, it is
useful to substitute (15) into (14) and rewrite the Euler equation for employed
households as follows:
bIEt 1þ stþ1 u
I 0ðdI þ lþ atRtþ1Þ  g
g
 
Rtþ1

¼ 1:

(16)
Consider, for the sake of argument, the effect of a fully predictable increase in st+1
holding Rt+1 constant. The direct effect is to increase 1+st+1[u
I0(dI + l + atRt+1)g]/g,
since the proportional change in marginal utility associated with becoming
unemployed, [uI0(dI + l + atRt+1)g]/g, is positive (see Figure 1). Hence,
uI0(dI + l + atRt+1) must go down for (16) to hold, which is achieved by increasing
date t asset holdings, at.
2.1.2. The hand-to-mouth case
In the case where the borrowing constraint is binding for all impatient
households, then by (2) the consumption levels of employed and unemployed
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households are, respectively, wt(1  st)l(Rt  1) and dI  l(Rt  1), meaning
that all impatient households consume their income in every period. Our
model thus contains the ‘hand-to-mouth’ model as a special case. As discussed
below, this corner scenario arises most notably when either direct unemployment
insurance is sufficiently generous (so households do not self-insure) or impatient
households’ discount factor is sufficiently low (i.e. households are too impatient to
save).
2.1.3. Aggregation
The analysis above implies that, under conditions (11) and (12), the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth amongst impatient households at any point in time has at most
two states. There are exactly two wealth states (l and at > l) if the borrowing
constraint is binding for unemployed households but not for employed households;
there is exactly one wealth state (l) if the constraint is binding for all impatient
households. This in turn implies that the economy is populated by at most four types of
impatient households since, by (2), the type of household depends on both beginning-
of-period and end-of-period asset wealth. We call these types ‘ij’, where i, j 2 [e, u].
Here i (j) refers to the household’s employment status in the previous (current)
period. For example, a ‘ue household’ is currently employed but was unemployed in
the previous period; its consumption at date t is cuet . The individual consumption levels
are:
ceet ¼ wIt ð1 stÞ þ Rtat1  at ; ceut ¼ dI þ lþ Rtat1; (17)
cuet ¼ wIt ð1 stÞ  at  lRt ; cuut ¼ dI þ l lRt ; (18)
where at is given by (16) in the precautionary-saving case and by l in the hand-to-
mouth case. Hence, in the latter case, ceet ¼ cuet and ceut ¼ cuut . Finally, defining xij to be
the measure of impatient households of type ij in the economy at date t, gives us the
labour market flows:
xeet ¼ Xð1 stÞðxeet1 þ xuet1Þ; xeut ¼ Xstðxeet1 þ xuet1Þ; (19)
xuut ¼ Xð1 ftÞðxeut1 þ xuut1Þ; xuet ¼ Xftðxeut1 þ xuut1Þ: (20)
The limited cross-sectional heterogeneity that prevails across impatient households
implies that we can exactly aggregate their asset holding choices. By (12) and (15), the
total asset holdings by impatient households is:
AIt  X
X
e¼0;1
Z þ1
~a¼l
atð~a; eÞdFtð~a; eÞ ¼ X½ntat  ð1 ntÞl; (21)
which can be substituted into market-clearing condition (8). Similarly, aggregating
individual consumption levels (17) and (18) given the distribution of types in (19) and
(20), we find total consumption by impatient households to be:
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CIt  X
X
e¼0;1
Z þ1
~a¼l
ctð~a; eÞdFtð~a; eÞ
¼ X½ntwIt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 ntÞdI  þ ðRt  1ÞAIt1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
net income
 XD½ntðat þ lÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
change in asset wealth
;
(22)
where AIt1 is given by (21) and D is the difference operator (so that
DAIt ¼ XD½ntðat þ lÞ).
Equation (21) summarises the determinants of total consumption by impatient
households in the economy. At date t, their aggregate net income is given by past asset
accumulation and current factor payments – and hence taken as given by the house-
holds in the current period. The change in their total asset holdings, ΩD[nt(at + l)],
depends on both the change in the number of precautionary savers, Ωnt (the
‘extensive’ asset holding margin) and the assets held by each of them, at (the ‘intensive’
margin). The former is determined by employment flows and is thus beyond the
households’ control, while the latter is their key choice variable. In the precautionary-
saving case, at is given by (16) and hence increases when labour market conditions are
expected to worsen (i.e. st+1 is expected to fall), which contributes to a decrease in C
I
t .
In the hand-to-mouth (HTM) case, we simply have at = l, so that AI ;HTMt ¼ lX and
CI ;HTMt ¼ X½ntwIt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 ntÞdI  lðRt  1Þ; (23)
implying that only current labour market conditions affect CI ;HTMt via their effect on nt.
Comparing (22) and (23), we get:
CIt ¼ CI ;HTMt þ X½Rtnt1ðat1 þ lÞ  ntðat þ lÞ:
This expression shows how total consumption by impatient households differs across
the hand-to-mouth and the precautionary-saving cases. In the first case, only current
labour market conditions nt (in addition to the factor payments w
I
t ð1 stÞ, Rt) affect
CIt . In the second case, the same effects are at work but future labour market
conditions also matter because they affect at. This suggests that the precautionary-
savings model may display more consumption volatility than the hand-to-mouth model,
provided that labour market conditions are sufficiently persistent. This will be
confirmed in the quantitative analysis of Section 3.
2.2. Existence Conditions and Steady State
2.2.1. Existence conditions
The equilibrium with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity described so far exists
provided that two conditions are satisfied. First, the postulated ranking of consumption
levels for impatient households in (11) must hold in equilibrium. Second, unem-
ployed, impatient households must face a binding borrowing constraint (see (12)).
From (17)–(18), and the fact that at ≥ l (with equality in the hand-to-mouth case),
we have cuut  ceut and ceet  cuet . Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for (11) to
hold is ceut \c
\cuet , that is:
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dI þ lþ at1Rt\c\wIt ð1 stÞ  at  lRt : (24)
Unemployed, impatient households can be of two types, uu and eu; we need both to
face a binding borrowing constraint in equilibrium. However, since cuut  ceut (and
hence uI 0ðcuut Þ uI 0ðceut Þ), a necessary and sufficient condition for both types to be
constrained is:
uI 0ðceut Þ[ bIEtf½ftþ1uI 0ðcuet Þ þ ð1 ftþ1ÞuI 0ðcuutþ1ÞRtþ1g; (25)
where the right-hand side of the inequality is the expected, discounted marginal utility
of an eu household that is contemplating the possibility of either remaining
unemployed (with probability 1  f t+1) or finding a job (with probability f t+1). Under
the conjectured equilibrium we have uI 0ðcuet Þ ¼ g and cuutþ1 ¼ dI þ lð1 Rtþ1Þ, so (25)
becomes:
uI 0ðdI þ lþ at1RtÞ[ bIEt fftþ1gþ ð1 ftþ1ÞuI 0½dI þ lð1 Rtþ1ÞgRtþ1
 
: (26)
In what follows, we compute the steady state of our conjectured equilibrium and
derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for (24) and (26) to hold in the
absence of aggregate shocks. By continuity, they will also hold in the stochastic
equilibrium, provided that the magnitude of aggregate shocks is not too large. In
what follows, we exclusively focus on the case of ‘small’ aggregate shocks in the sense
that all macro-variables are assumed to remain in the vicinity of their steady-state
values. The case of ‘large’ shocks, and the conditions under which they are consistent
with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity, is discussed and analysed formally in the
separate online Appendix B. In some cases, the full nonlinear dynamics of the model
admits a two-state Markovian representation, making it straightforward to run
stochastic simulations of the model and to check its existence conditions. When the
baseline model does not literally admit such a representation (this occurs, for
example, whenever Ω < 1), then a open-economy version of the same model does
and can be solved and simulated in a similar way. In both cases, we find the support
of admissible exogenous aggregate shock processes such that (24)–(26) hold to be
large – much larger than the typical business cycle shock (see the online Appendix
for details).
2.2.2. Steady state
In the steady state, the real interest rate is determined by the discount rate of the most
patient households, so that R = 1/bP (see (6)). From (1) and (7), the steady-state
levels of employment and capital per effective labour unit are:
n ¼ f =ðf  þ sÞ; k ¼ g 01ð1=bP  1þ mÞ: (27)
A key variable in the model is the level of asset holdings that employed, impatient
households hold as a buffer against unemployment risk. If the borrowing constraint is
binding in the steady state, then they never hold any wealth. The interior solution to
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the steady-state counterpart of (16) (where R = 1/bP) gives the individual asset
holdings:
~a ¼ bP ½ðuI 01fg½1þ ðbP  bI Þ=bI sgÞ  dI  l: (28)
The borrowing constraint is binding whenever ~a\  l. Hence, the actual steady-
state wealth level of employed, impatient households is given by the following:
a ¼ max½l; ~a; (29)
which encompasses both the precautionary-saving and hand-to-mouth cases discussed
above. Finally, (8) and (21) imply that steady-state (total) asset holdings by impatient
and patient households are AI =Ω[na  (1 n)l] and AP = KAI = [Ω + (1Ω)j]
nk  AI, respectively. It then follows from (27) that the cross-sectional wealth
distribution is summarised by the following wealth shares:
AI
K 
¼ Xða
  ls=f Þ
g 01ð1=bP  1þ mÞ ;
AP
K 
¼ 1 A
I
K 
: (30)
Equations (28) and (29) are informative about the conditions under which
households find it worthwhile to hold a buffer stock of wealth in excess of the
borrowing limit. They do so whenever:
s
u0ðdI þ l l=bP Þ  g
g
 
[
bP  bI
bI
: (31)
The greater the relative impatience of impatient households, as measured by (bP 
bI)/bI, the less likely inequality (31) will hold. The greater the subjective cost of an
unbuffered transition from employment (where marginal utility is g) to unemploy-
ment (where marginal utility, without buffer-stock saving, is u 0(dI + ll/bP)),
weighted by the probability of this transition occurring (s), the more likely it will hold.
In particular, the greater the unemployment benefit dI, the lower the subjective cost of
falling into unemployment and the weaker the incentive to hold a buffer stock.
Formally, a(dI) is a non-increasing, continuous piecewise linear function with a kink at
the value of dI for which ~a ¼ l (see Figure 2).
The following Proposition establishes the conditions on the deep parameters of the
model under which a steady state with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity exists.
Provided that the aggregate shocks have a sufficiently small magnitude, the same
conditions will ensure the existence of a stochastic equilibrium with similarly limited
heterogeneity.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that
(i) there are no aggregate shocks;
(ii) unemployment insurance is incomplete (i.e. dI < wI(1  s) and
(iii) the following inequality holds:
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g 1þb
PbI
bI s
	 

[
max
bI
bP
f gþð1 f Þu0 dI l 1
bP
1
	 
  
; u0
wIð1sÞþbPdI
1þbP l
1
bP
1
	 
  
;
where
s ¼ ½Xd
I þ ð1 XÞdP ð1 nÞ
½Xþ ð1 XÞjnwI ; (32)
wI=g(k)kg 0(k), and (n, k) are given by (27). Then, it is always possible to find a utility
threshold c such that the conjectured limited-heterogeneity equilibrium described above exists. In
this equilibrium, a > l (a = l) if (31) holds (does not hold).
Proof. First, the steady-state counterpart of (26) is:
a\bPuI 01
bI
bP
f gþ ð1 f Þu0 dI þ l b
P  1
bP
	 
  	 

 bP ðdI þ lÞ: (33)
Second, the steady-state counterpart of (24) is dI + l + a/bP < c<wI(1  st)
a  l/bP. A sufficient condition for the existence of a threshold c is thus dI + l + a/
bP<wI(1  st)  al/bP, or:
a\bPC=ð1þ bP Þ  l; (34)
where Γ  wI(1  s)  dI=(1  s)[g(k)  kg 0(k)]  dI is a strictly positive constant
that only depends on the deep parameters of the model (see (27) and (32)).
Inequalities (33) and (34) hold for a = l (the hand-to-mouth case). Otherwise, a is
Precautionary
Saving Case 
Hand-to-mouth 
Case
a*(δI)
δ I
–µ
Fig 2. Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving
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given by (28) (the precautionary-saving case). Substituting this value of a into (33)
and (34) and rearranging gives the inequality in the Proposition.
The inequalities in Proposition 1 ensure that two properties hold at the steady state.
First, the candidate equilibrium features at most two possible wealth levels for
impatient households (l for the unemployed and a ≥ l for the employed).
Second, the implied ranking of individual consumption levels is such that we can
‘reverse-engineer’ an instant utility function for these households of the form depicted
in Figure 1. These inequalities are straightforward to check once specific values are
assigned to the deep parameters of the model. As we argue in Section 3, the
inequalities are satisfied for plausible values when we calibrate the model to the US
economy. This is because our limited-heterogeneity equilibrium requires that
impatient unemployed households be borrowing-constrained (i.e. they would like to
borrow against future income but are prevented from doing so) and that impatient
employed households accumulate too little wealth in equilibrium – so little that their
wealth will be exhausted after the first quarter of unemployment. In the US, the
quarter-to-quarter probability of leaving unemployment is high and the replacement
ratio is relatively low. This causes the expected income of the unemployed to be larger
than current income, thereby making these households willing to borrow. On the
other hand, the US distribution of wealth is fairly unequal, leading a large fraction of
the population (the impatient in our model) to hold a very small fraction of total
wealth.
2.2.3. An approximate asset holding rule
We conclude this Section by stressing that when (employed) impatient households do
make precautionary saving, then local time-variations in the job-loss probability st+1
have a first-order effect on precautionary asset accumulation at the individual level, at.
This is because, even without aggregate risk, a change in employment status from
employed to unemployed at date t + 1 is associated with a discontinuous drop in
individual consumption and, hence, with an infra-marginal rise in marginal utility from
g to uI
0
(ceu) > g. The probability st+1 weights this possibility in the employed
households’ Euler equation (see (16)), so even small changes in st+1 have a sizable
impact on asset holdings and consumption choices. To illustrate this point, we let hats
denote level-deviations from the steady state (i.e. x^t ¼ xt  x), and use (16) to arrive at
the following approximation of the optimal asset-holding rule:5
a^t ’ Cþ CsEtðs^tþ1Þ þ CREtðR^tþ1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
first-order terms
þCs2
2
Etðs^2tþ1Þ þ
CR2
2
EtðR^2tþ1Þ þ
CsR
2
Et s^tþ1R^tþ1
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
second-order terms
; (35)
where the Γs are constants. The first-order responsiveness of precautionary wealth
(a^t ¼ at  a) to unemployment risk (as measured by s^tþ1 ¼ stþ1  s) is given by the
composite parameter:
5 See the online Appendix for details, including the expressions for all coefficients in the rule.
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Cs ¼ ðb
P  bI Þ½bP ðdI þ lÞ þ a
½bP  bI ð1 sÞsrI ðceuÞ [ 0;
where a is given by (28), ceu = dI + l + aR is the steady-state counterpart of ceut in (17)
and rI(ceu)  ceuuI0 0(ceu)/uI0(ceu). The greater Γs, the stronger the response of
individual asset holdings to shocks affecting the job-loss rate; such shocks thus affect
total consumption (by (22)) even when the second-order terms of the model’s
aggregate dynamics are neglected. Note that this first-order effect of time-varying
idiosyncratic risk does not depend on the fact that the constraint be immediately
binding when a worker falls into unemployment. What matters is that the job loss be
associated with a infra-marginal drop in individual consumption, which also occurs
when the worker does not immediately face a binding constraint but may face it in the
future (and hence spreads the consumption fall over several periods). We analyse this
possibility in the separate online Appendix A to the article. The property that time-
varying idiosyncratic risk affects savings at the first order distinguishes models with
borrowing limits – included ours – from those that root the precautionary motive into
households’ ‘prudence’ (i.e. positive third-order derivative (Kimball, 1990)) and
wherein time-variations in precautionary savings follow from changes in the second-
order term of future marginal utility (Gourinchas and Parker, 2001; Parker and
Preston, 2005).6
3. Time-varying Precautionary Saving and Consumption Fluctuations
The model above implies that some households respond to countercyclical changes in
unemployment risk by raising precautionary wealth and thus by decreasing consump-
tion more than they would have without the precautionary motive. We now assess the
extent of this effect on total consumption when realistic unemployment shocks are fed
into our model economy. To do so, we compute the response of aggregate
consumption and output to aggregate shocks implied by our baseline model. We
then compare it with the data and several alternative benchmarks (namely, the hand-
to-mouth model, the representative-agent model, and the Krusell and Smith (1998)
model).
3.1. Summary of the Baseline Precautionary-saving Model
The precautionary-saving model includes three forcing variables (zt, f t, st) and
ten endogenous variables (nt ; kt ; CIt ; C
P
t ; A
P
t ; A
I
t ; at ; Rt ; w
I
t ; st), linked through the
following equations:
bIEt f1þ stþ1½uI 0ðdI þ lþ atRtþ1Þ  g=ggRtþ1
  ¼ 1; (EE-I)
6 It is apparent from (16) that a mean-preserving increase in employed households’ uncertainty about
future labour income, taking the form of an increase in st+1 (and a corresponding rise in wt+1 to keep
expected income constant), increases asset holdings. This is the usual definition of ‘precautionary saving’.
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CIt þ AIt ¼ X½ntwIt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 ntÞdI  þ RtAIt1; (BC-I)
AIt ¼ X½ntat  ð1 ntÞl; (A-I)
bPEtðuP 0f½CPtþ1=ð1 XÞRtþ1=uP 0½CPt =ð1 XÞgÞ ¼ 1; (EE-P)
CPt þ APt ¼ ð1 XÞ½jntwIt ð1 stÞ þ ð1 ntÞdP  þ RtAPt1; (BC-P)
Rt ¼ ztg 0ðktÞ þ 1 m; (IR)
wIt ¼ zt ½g ðktÞ  ktg 0ðktÞ; (WA)
APt1 þ AIt1 ¼ ½Xþ ð1 XÞjntkt ; (CM)
stntw
I
t ½Xþ ð1 XÞj ¼ ð1 ntÞ½XdI þ ð1 XÞdP ; (UI)
nt ¼ ð1 nt1Þft þ ð1 stÞnt1: (EM)
Equations (EE-I)–(A-I) are the Euler condition and aggregate budget constraint
for impatient households – as described in subsection 2.1. Equations (EE-P)
and (BC-P) are the same conditions for patient households, as described in
subsection 1.1, where wPt has been replaced by its equilibrium value, jw
I
t . (IR)
follows from (7), with the factor price frontier under CRS giving wIt in (WA). (CM)
is the market-clearing condition for capital, which follows from substituting (21)
into (8). Finally, (UI) is the balanced-budget condition for the unemployment
insurance scheme (where again wPt ¼ jwIt has been substituted into (10)), and
(EM) is the law of motion for employment. The model above can be linearised to
give:
a^t ¼ CsEtðs^tþ1Þ þ CREtðR^tþ1Þ; (EE-I*)
C^ It þ A^It ¼ X nð1 sÞw^It þ ½wIð1 sÞ  dI n^t  nwIs^t
 þAIR^t þRA^It1; (BC-I*)
A^It ¼ Xna^t þ Xða þ lÞn^t ; (A-I*)
EtðDC^Ptþ1=CPÞ ¼ ðrP=RÞEtðR^tþ1Þ; (EE-P*)
C^Pt þ A^Pt ¼ ð1XÞ nð1 sÞjw^It þ ½jwIð1 sÞ dP n^t njwIs^t
 þAPR^t þRA^Pt1;
(BC-P*)
R^t ¼ ½g 0ðkÞz^t þ g 00ðkÞk^t ; (IR*)
w^It ¼ ½g ðkÞ  kg 0ðkÞz^t  kg 00ðkÞk^t ; (WA*)
A^Pt1 þ A^It1 ¼ ½Xþ ð1 XÞjðnk^t þ kn^tÞ; (CM*)
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snw^It þ swIn^t þ nwIs^t ¼ 
XdI þ ð1 XÞdP
Xþ ð1 XÞj
 
n^t ; (UI*)
n^t ¼ ð1 nÞf^t  f n^t1 þ ð1 sÞn^t1  ns^t ; (EM*)
where hats denote level-deviations from the steady state and (Γs, ΓR) are as in (35).
3.2. Alternative Benchmarks
3.2.1. Hand-to-mouth model
When condition (31) holds, all impatient households face a binding borrowing
constraint in every period, so that at = l and AIt ¼ lX for all t (see subsection 2.1
above). The resulting dynamics are obtained by removing (EE-I) from the baseline
model and by imposing at = l in (A-I). Moreover, since A^It1 ¼ 0 the linearised hand-
to-mouth model is composed of (EE-P*), (BC-P*), (IR*), (WA*), (UI*) and (EM*),
together with the following modifications of (BC-I*) and (CM*):
C^ It ¼ Xnð1 sÞw^It þ X½wI ð1 sÞ  dI n^t  XnwI s^t þlXR^t ;
A^Pt1 ¼ ½Xþ ð1 XÞj nk^t þ kn^t
 
:
3.2.2. Representative-agent model
The comparable representative-agent model is obtained by setting ΩRA = 0 (so that
all households are identical and fully insured) and jRA = Ω + (1  Ω)j (so that
average labour productivity is the same as in the baseline model). With bP
unchanged, R, k, as well as steady-state total wealth [Ω + (1  Ω)j]nk (see (6)),
remain unchanged. The model is composed of equations (EE-P*) and (IR* WA*),
(EM*) and:
C^Pt þ A^Pt ¼ nð1 sÞjw^It þ ½jwI ð1 sÞ  dP n^t ;njwIs^t þ APR^t þ RA^Pt1;
A^Pt1 ¼ jRAðnk^t þ kn^tÞ;
snw^It þ swIn^t þ nwIs^t ¼ ðdP=jRAÞn^t :
3.2.3. Krusell–Smith model
We also compare the quantitative properties of our model with the stochastic-beta
version of the Krusell and Smith (1998) heterogeneous-agent model. We focus on the
stochastic-beta model for essentially two reasons: first, because it incorporates discount
factor heterogeneity, which, as with our model, potentially generates a substantial
amount of wealth dispersion; and second, because it is the model variant that
quantitatively differs most from the full-insurance model. In order to compare the
stochastic properties of our baseline model with the Krusell–Smith model mean-
ingfully, we rescale the size of the aggregate shocks (TFP and unemployment) in the
latter so as to produce the same output volatility as our baseline model (see subsection
3.4.1 for details).
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3.3. Calibration
3.3.1. Idiosyncratic risk and insurance
The period is a quarter. We set the steady-state values of f  and s to their quarter-to-
quarter, post-war averages (see our online Appendix for a description of all the series
used in this Section). In a narrow sense, the gross replacement ratio d j/wj, j = I, P, is
the income provided by the unemployment insurance scheme and should thus be set
between 0.4 and 0.5 for the US (Shimer, 2005; Chetty, 2008). However, households
also benefit from other sources of insurance (family, friends etc.) so we take this into
account by calibrating d j/wj so as to generate a plausible level of consumption
insurance for the period following the job loss (i.e. the following quarter here).
Cochrane (1991) argues that the average consumption growth of consumers
experiencing an involuntary job loss is 25 percentage points lower than those who
do not. Gruber (1997) focuses on the impact of UI benefits on the size of the
consumption fall of households having experienced a job loss. He finds an average fall
of about 7%.7 We set the baseline value of d j/wj to 0.6 (rather than, say, 0.5) which,
together with the other parameters of the model, produces a consumption growth
differential of 14.26% for the average household.8 As we show below, it turns out that
the calibrated value of d j/wj mainly affects the cross-sectional distribution of wealth
but has a limited effect on aggregate volatility statistics. In our baseline scenario we
assume that impatient households cannot borrow (i.e. l = 0) and we then relax this
constraint in our sensitivity analysis.
3.3.2. Preferences and technology
Impatient households in our baseline precautionary-saving model are somewhat
wealthier than pure hand-to-mouth consumers. Since we are moving one step up in the
wealth distribution – relative to households facing a binding debt limit and holding not
wealth – we calibrate their share at a level that is no less than the available estimates of
the share of hand-to-mouth households in the US economy. Estimates range from 15%
to 60% (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Iacoviello, 2005; Gali et al., 2007; Mertens and
Ravn, 2011; Kaplan and Violante, 2014); we thus set Ω = 0.6 in our baseline
specification. Since only a fraction 1  n of such households face a binding
borrowing constraint in the baseline and, given the calibrated steady-state transition
rates f  and s, this implies a steady-state share of effectively borrowing-constrained
households of Ω(1  n) = 3.4%.9 The discount factor of patient households, bP (= 1/
R), is set to 0.99 and their instant utility to uP(c) = ln c. The utility function of
7 This strand of the microeconometric literature uses the PSID. As a consequence, it measures variations in
food consumption (rather than total non-durable and services consumption) at the yearly (rather than
quarterly) frequency. As a result, when a household is reported unemployed it may have been so for more
than a quarter.
8 Patient households are fully insured and hence experience no fall in consumption when becoming
unemployed. Hence, the average proportional consumption drop associated with this event is Ω(ceceu)/ce,
where ce  f (1n)cue + (1s)ncee is the average consumption of employed, impatient households. Given
that our calibrated replacement ratio is perfectly symmetric across households, we are implicitly ignoring the
potential redistributive effects of the unemployment insurance scheme.
9 Of course, in our hand-to-mouth benchmark the share of effectively constrained households increases
from (1  n)Ω (= 3.4%) to Ω (= 60%) since all impatient households, including the employed, are then
constrained.
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
2016] P R E C A U T I O N A R Y S A V I N G O V E R TH E C Y C L E 153
impatient households is:
uI ðcÞ ¼ ln c for c 1:6
ln 1:6þ 0:504ðc  1:6Þ for c[ 1:6;

(36)
which satisfies the assumptions in subsection 2.1.1 (with g = 0.504 and c = 1.6). The
chosen value of g is equal to the steady-state marginal utility of ee households (by far the
most numerous amongst the impatient) if they had the same instant utility function as
patient households, given the other parameters.10 This choice was meant to minimise
differences in asset holding behaviour purely due to differences in instant utility
functions. Note that uI(c) is continuous and (weakly) concave but not differentiable
over the entirety of [0, ∞) since uI
0
(1.6) > 0.504. However, it can be made so by
equating the right and left derivatives of uI() in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of
c while preserving concavity. We set bI to match the wealth share of the Ω% poorest
households, given the other parameters. We focus on liquid wealth, since our analysis
pertains to the part of households’ net worth that can readily be used for current (non-
durable) consumption. A value of bI = 0.972 produces a wealth share of 0.30% for the
poorest 60% of households, matching the corresponding quantile of the distribution
of liquid wealth in the Survey of Consumer Finances (see the online Appendix for
details).
The production function is Yt ¼ ztK at ðnIt þ jnPt Þ1a, with a = 1/3, and the depreci-
ation rate is m = 2.5%. The skill premium parameter j is set to 1.731. Given the other
parameters, this value for the skill premium will produce a consumption share CI/
(CI+CP) of 40.62% for the poorest 60% of households. This matches the cross-
sectional distribution of non-durables in the Consumer Expenditure Survey and is also
well in line with direct measures of the skill premium (Heathcote et al., 2010;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
Our baseline parameterisation is summarised in Table 1. These parameters satisfy
the existence conditions stated in Proposition. In particular, households that become
unemployed exhaust their buffer stock of wealth within a quarter. Note that given the
baseline values of Ω and j, the representative-agent economy (in which ΩRA = 0) must
be parameterised with a skill premium parameter jRA =Ω + (1  Ω)j = 1.292.
3.4. Aggregate Consumption Volatility
3.4.1. Experiment
To compute the second-order moment properties of the various model specifications
under consideration, we proceed as follows. We first estimate the joint behaviour of the
exogenous state vector over the entire post-war period using a VAR
xt ¼
P4
j¼1 Ajxtj þ et . Here xt ¼ ½~zt ; ~ft ; ~st 0 includes log-total factor productivity (‘TFP’
henceforth), made stationary using the HP-filter, as well as the job-finding and job-
separation rates – also HP-filtered to remove their low-frequency movements. et is the
193 vector of residuals. This gives us Aj, j = 1. . .4 as well as the covariance matrix
Σ  Var(et). We then log-linearise the three model variants and solve for their state-
10 That is, g solves g = uP
0
(cee) = [wI + a(11/bP)]1.
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space representation zt = Bzt1 + xt, where zt is the relevant vector of endogenous
variables. Last, we run stochastic simulations of each model with repeated shocks on xt
that have the same stochastic properties as the estimated VAR. Our results are almost
identical when we consider a second-order rather than a first-order approximation of
each model under consideration (the results are available from the authors upon
request); this indicates that nonlinearities are not strong (at least under our baseline
calibration) and confirms the importance of the first-order effects of time-varying
idiosyncratic risk on individual savings.
As discussed above, we also compare these moments to those implied by a rescaled
version of the stochastic-beta, Krusell–Smith model. More specifically, we simulate
exactly the same model except that we specify the following support for the (two-state)
aggregate exogenous state: unemployment varies from 5.4% (in the good state) to
8.6% (in the bad state) and TFP is equal to 1 in both states.11 The transition
probabilities across aggregate states are as in the original article, and the transitions
across individual states (given those across aggregate states and the two values of the
unemployment rate) are computed in the same way (Krusell and Smith, 1998, Section
IV for details). We compute, for each relevant aggregate time series, the deviations
from the sample mean resulting from the stochastic simulation of the model and then
report the corresponding statistics in Table 4 (Model 4). Our rescaling of the support
of the exogenous state implies that the Krusell–Smith model now produces the same
output volatility as our baseline precautionary-saving model – thereby making to two
models comparable from a quantitative point of view.
3.4.2. Results
The quantitative merits of the four models under consideration – our baseline
precautionary-saving model and the three alternative benchmarks introduced above –
Table 1
Baseline Model: Parameters and Implied Steady State
Parameters Symbol Value Steady state (%) Value Data Source
Share of impatient households Ω 0.6 Unemployment rate 5.54 5.54 CPS
Discount factor (patient) bP 0.990 Liquid wealth share of
Discount factor (impatient) bI 0.972 bottom Ω% 0.30 0.30 SCF
Risk aversion rI,P 1 Consumption share of
Replacement ratio d/w 0.6 bottom Ω% 40.62 40.62 CEX
Borrowing limit l 0.0 Mean cons. fall after
Skill premium parameter j 1.731 unemployment shock 14.23 [7,25] See text
Capital share a 1/3
Depreciation rate m 0.025
Job-finding rate f  0.8021
Job separation rate s 0.047
Notes. The model matches the mean unemployment rate by construction. bI, j are set so that the wealth and
consumption shares of the model (column 5) match their empirical counterparts (column 6), given the
other parameters of the model (see text for details).
11 Plausible alternative rescaling schemes do not significantly affect aggregate volatilities.
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Table 2
Summary Business-cycle Statistics
Economies
Statistics (%)
Wealth share
Standard deviations Correlation with Y
AI=K  Y C I aY =K C I aY =K
1 Data 0.30 1.65 0.84 7.22 1.60 78 87 97
2 Precautionary saving 0.30 1.29 0.79 3.68 1.32 82 92 93
Alternative models
3 Hand-to-mouth 0.00 1.31 0.64 3.57 1.29 96 99 92
4 Krusell–Smith (rescaled) 5.3 1.29 0.84 5.15 1.10 16 89 57
5 Representative agent irr. 1.32 0.40 5.05 1.32 50 97 86
Sensitivity
2 Baseline 0.30 1.29 0.79 3.68 1.32 82 92 93
2a Ω = 0.30 0.13 1.31 0.49 4.39 1.32 78 97 89
2b d/w = 0.45 0.81 1.29 0.77 3.69 1.32 82 92 93
2c d/w = 2/3 0.07 1.29 0.79 3.68 1.32 82 92 93
2d j = 1 0.39 1.29 0.96 3.44 1.32 81 85 94
2e bI = 0.9792 0.59 1.30 0.70 3.57 1.31 90 96 93
2f l = 0.173 0.01 1.29 0.78 3.69 1.32 82 92 93
2g
bI ¼ 0:979
l ¼ 0:173

0.30 1.30 0.70 3.57 1.31 90 96 93
2h rI,P=0.75 0.06 1.29 0.85 3.74 1.32 78 89 94
2i rI,P=1.5 0.56 1.30 0.71 3.64 1.32 88 95 91
Economies Statistics (%)
Wealth share
Autocorrelations
AI=K  Y C I aY =K
1 Data 0.30 84 83 79 85
2 Precautionary saving 0.30 81 57 73 80
Alternative models
3 Hand-to-mouth 0.00 82 86 80 80
4 Krusell–Smith 5.3 83 90 72 74
5 Representative agent irr. 82 98 81 80
Sensitivity
2 Baseline 0.30 81 57 73 80
2a Ω = 0.30 0.13 82 77 80 80
2b d/w = 0.45 0.81 81 57 74 80
2c d/w = 2/3 0.07 81 57 73 80
2d j = 1 0.39 81 53 64 80
2e bI = 0.9792 0.59 82 71 77 80
2f l = 0.173 0.01 81 57 73 80
2g
bI ¼ 0:979
l ¼ 0:173

0.30 82 71 77 80
2h rI,P=0.75 0.06 81 51 69 80
2i rI,P=1.5 0.56 82 65 77 80
Notes. Models 2, 3, and 5 are linearised and then simulated according to the estimated joint process for (f t,st,
zt). All second-order moments pertain to proportional deviations from the steady state and are thus
comparable to the empirical series, which are in log-deviations from trend. Model 4 is simulated as in Krusell
and Smith (1998, Sec. IV), except that the shocks have been rescaled so that output deviations from the mean
be of the same standard deviation as Model 2 (see subsection 3.4.1 and footnote 13 for details).
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
156 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ F E B R U A R Y
can be evaluated in light of their answers to the following two questions. First, does a
particular model predict the correct amount aggregate (notably output) volatility,
relative to the data? And, second, at a given level of aggregate volatility, how consistent
with the data are the relative volatilities of the components of output, that is
consumption and investment? The second question is of particular interest because we
expect the precautionary motive to alter individual consumption-saving plans and the
relative volatilities of consumption and investment substantially, when compared to an
economy without the precautionary motive.
It is apparent from the comparison of the data (row 1) and Model 2 in Table 2 that,
under the shock process described above, the baseline precautionary-saving model
tends to underestimate aggregate volatility (in output, consumption and investment).
Such is also the case of the representative-agent and hand-to-mouth models.
Importantly, given this overall underestimation of aggregate volatility our baseline
model generates a substantial amount of consumption volatility (with a standard
deviation of 0.79%, against 0.84% in the data). The reason for this was discussed in
subsection 2.1: in the precautionary-saving case, aggregate consumption responds not
only to current labour market conditions (via their impact on current income) but also
to future labour market conditions (via their impact on current precautionary wealth,
see (17)–(18)). Provided that labour market conditions are persistent (which they are),
the precautionary motive tends to reinforce the consumption response to aggregate
shocks. In contrast, fluctuations in the precautionary motive are absent from both the
hand-to-mouth and representative-agent models (Models 3 and 5) and, as a result, they
generate relatively little consumption volatility (0.64% and 0.40%, respectively).
These results imply that our baseline precautionary-saving model departs signifi-
cantly from the comparable representative-agent model as regards aggregate time-
series behaviour. Why is it so and, in particular, why does this result differ from that in
the original analysis by Krusell and Smith (1998), who found their model to depart
little from their comparable representative-agent model? As discussed above, our
model is parameterised to match the share of liquid wealth held by the poorest 60%. In
contrast, the original Krusell–Smith model is parameterised to fit the Lorenz curve for
net worth. Since the latter is much less unequally distributed than liquid wealth, the
Krusell–Smith model generates a much greater wealth share for the poorest 60% than
does our baseline model. This implies that many ‘poor’ households remain quite well
self-insured in Krusell and Smith (1998) (and hence behave much like the permanent-
income consumers), which is not the case of the workers in our model.
Looking at investment, one notices that what is gained in terms of consumption
volatility is somewhat lost in terms of investment volatility, a dimension in which our
baseline model fares particularly badly (but not as badly as the hand-to-mouth model).
In particular, the representative-agent model generates a level of investment volatility
that is both larger and closer to the data than that produced by our baseline model.
This directly follows from the lack of buffer-stock saving behaviour in the represen-
tative-agent economy. Indeed, in a recession aggregate savings fall more in the
representative-agent economy, where households’ savings decrease significantly, than
in the precautionary-saving economy, where the rise in the job-loss rate strengthens the
precautionary motive to save. Hence investment, and thereby the capital stock and
aggregate output, also falls more. Finally, comparing Model 2 and Model 4 reveals that
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the latter outperform ours in terms of volatility statistics (in the sense that
consumption and investment volatility are both closer to the data). However, Model
4 clearly underestimates the consumption – output correlation.
Table 3 provides additional distributional statistics for the baseline precautionary
model. Overall, the wealth share of impatient households displays little aggregate
volatility, essentially because its movements are driven by opposing forces (i.e. the
intensive versus extensive asset holding margins discussed in subsection 2.1). It is also
countercyclical because patient households (permanent-income consumers) actively
deplete their asset wealth in recessions while employed impatient households (i.e. the
precautionary savers) limit the fall in their asset wealth as soon as the job separation
rate rises (see (EE-I)). For the same reasons, the consumption share of impatient
households is not very volatile (when compared to its overall level) and highly
procyclical; at a given income process, individual consumption is the mirror image of
wealth accumulation. Finally, in our model, the share of constrained households tracks
the unemployment rate by construction and is thus both volatile and countercyclical.
3.4.3. Sensitivity
We now evaluate the robustness of the time-series properties of the precautionary-saving
model (Model 2) with respect to changes in the deep parameters of the model. Since we
are mainly interested in the determinants of the strength of the precautionary motive,
both in the steady state andover thebusiness cycle, we focus exclusively on theparameters
that affect the extent of incomplete insurance and the shapes of the cross-sectional
distributions of income and wealth. To this purpose, the bottom part of Table 2 reports
the sensitivity of themoments under considerationwith respect to changes in the share of
impatient households Ω (Model 2a), the replacement ratio dI/wI (Models 2b and 2c),
the skill premiumj (Model 2d), the subjective discount factor of impatient householdsbI
(Models 2e and 2g), the borrowing limit l (Models 2f and 2g) and the degree of risk
aversion rI (Models 2h and 2i). The parameters Ω, dI/wI and l directly affect
households’ ability to insure (or self-insure), while bI, j and rI affect it indirectly via their
impact on the equilibrium cross-sectional distributions. Incidentally, we explore the
range of admissible parameter values such that our existence conditions (24)–(26) hold.
Unsurprisingly, when Ω falls, then the population is on average better insured
against idiosyncratic shocks, so the dynamics of the model gets closer to that of the
representative economy (see Model 2a). More interesting is the impact of the
replacement ratio dI/wI (Models 2b and 2c). Note first that, given the value of the
Table 3
Summary Distributional Statistics
Wealth share Consumption share
Share of constrained
households
AI/K CI/(CI+CP) Ω(1n)
Mean 0.30 40.62 3.32
Standard deviation 0.05 0.41 0.47
Correlation with output 86.29 71.51 83.30
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other parameters, the existence of our equilibrium with positive precautionary saving is
ensured for dI/wI 2 [0.42, 0.69]. When dI/wI > 0.69, households are so well insured
that the precautionary motive vanishes and the economy becomes hand-to-mouth (see
condition (31)). In contrast, when dI/wI < 0.42 the precautionary motive is so strong,
and the implied amount of precautionary wealth so large, that the equilibrium with
instant asset liquidation ceases to exist (see condition (26) and condition (33) in the
Proof of Proposition 1).12 We run our sensitivity experiments with values of dI/wI that
are close to these bounds: dI/wI = 0.45 for Model 2b and dI/wI = 2/3 for Model 2c.
We find the second-order moments under consideration to be almost unchanged
relative to the baseline case. The only statistics that is significantly altered by the value
of dI/wI is the wealth share of impatient households; this is because, as explained in
subsection 2.2 above, better direct insurance opportunities crowd out their self-
insurance (see Figure 2), thereby deterring the poor to save and raising wealth
dispersion.
With Model 2e to 2g, we consider variations in the subjective discount factor (bI) and
the borrowing limit (l), both in isolation and jointly. As already mentioned, l affects
households’ ability to smooth idiosyncratic shocks not only directly but also indirectly
(via its impact on the distribution of wealth), as does bI. The reason for studying joint
variations in these two parameters is as follows. From (28) and (30), the wealth share
AI/K is given by:
AI 
K 
¼ Xða
  ls=f Þ
g 01ð1=bP  1þ mÞ ¼
X nbP uI 01 g 1þ b
P  bI
bI s
	 
 
 dI  l
 
 ls

f 
	 

g 01ð1=bP  1þ mÞ ;
which is increasing in bI but decreasing in l. This implicitly defines a set (l,bI)
consistent with a given value of AI/K (0.30% in our calibration). Intuitively, the
wealth share can be 0.30 either because impatient households have a zero debt limit
and the employed are close to the borrowing limit, or because they have a looser
borrowing limit but are more patient and hence hold a greater buffer stock ahead of
the limit. Let l(bI;AI/K) define the implicit function relating l to bI for a given value
of AI/K and note from our baseline scenario that l(0.972;0.30%) = 0. As bI increases,
l increases (so as to leave AI/K unchanged) and impatient households become more
self-insured against unemployment risk (since the size of their buffer ahead of the
borrowing limit rises). There is an upper limit to the value of bI, above which
households are so well self-insured that condition (24) is violated (i.e. ceu>cue, an
inconsistency). Holding the other parameter constant, this value of bI is 0.9792 and the
associated debt limit generating AI/K = 0.3% is l = 0.173, or 2.15% of average
annual labour income.13 Model 2g studies the impact on the business cycle of the joint
change in (bI, l), while Models 2e and 2f each impose one value at a time holding the
other parameter at its baseline value.
12 See the online Appendix for how to extend the present analysis to the case where full asset liquidation
takes more than one period of unemployment.
13 Under our calibration the average annual labour income of impatient households is
nwI+(1n)dI = 8.04.
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
2016] P R E C A U T I O N A R Y S A V I N G O V E R TH E C Y C L E 159
The cross-sectional distribution of income, and thereby the ability of the different
types of households to accumulate assets, is directly affected by the skill premium
parameter j. In Model 2d we set this parameter to 1, that is we remove any
heterogeneity in labour efficiency across patient and impatient households. Since all
employed households now earn the same wage, wealth is (slightly) more equally
distributed. However, this specification overestimates the consumption of the poorest
60% of the population, as they end up consuming 53% of total consumption (not
reported in Table 2) against 41% in the data (see Table 1). Since the consumption of
impatient consumers responds more to aggregate shocks than that of patient
consumers, the composition effect leads to an overestimation of the volatility of
consumption.
Finally, Models 2h and 2i examine how the degree of risk aversion impacts the
results. To do this, we assume that uP(c)=(c1r1)/(1r), r > 0, while
uI ðcÞ ¼ ðc
1r  1Þ=ð1 rÞ for c  c
ðc1r  1Þ þ gðc  cÞ for c[ c:

Here, g is still computed as described in footnote 9 while c can be reverse-engineered
whenever ceu<cue. With such preferences, the parameter r faces similar bounds as for
dI/wI: if r is too low, the precautionary motive is so weak that the economy becomes
hand-to-mouth, while if r is too high it is so strong that the borrowing constraint is no
longer binding for impatient households that become unemployed. Given the other
parameters, we find that a steady state with positive precautionary saving requires
r 2 [0.70, 1.57]. We thus compute business cycle statistics for r = 0.75 and for r = 1.5.
As expected, stronger risk aversion leads to more buffer-stock saving by impatient
households and hence a greater wealth share AI/K. It further leads to a lower
consumption volatility and a greater auto-correlation, both of which follow from the
fact that intertemporal substituability is lower and hence households wish to smooth
consumption more in the face of aggregate shocks.
3.4.4. Comparison with a strictly concave utility function
While our model is not meant to be an approximation to a fully-fledged heteroge-
neous-agent model with a strictly concave utility function, it is nevertheless useful to
look at the implications of our non-standard utility function (as opposed to CRRA
preferences, for example). We do so by measuring Euler equation errors and proceed
as follows. We first solve and run stochastic simulations of our baseline model, and so
generate time series for ceet , Et c
ee
tþ1, Et c
eu
tþ1 and EtðRtþ1Þ that are consistent with our quasi-
linear utility function.14 We then use several metrics to measure the quantitative
difference between that model and the model with the same dynamics but a strictly
concave utility function.
First, we define the ex ante interest rate Nt  Etð ~Rtþ1Þ as the interest rate that is
consistent with the linearised counterpart of an Euler equation with concave period
utility ~uðcÞ ¼ ðc1~r  1Þ=ð1 ~rÞ, ~r[ 0:
14 The expectations Etðcejtþ1Þ, j = e,u, and Et ðRtþ1Þ are computed using the state-space representation of the
model, zt = Bzt1 + xt (see subsection 4.4).
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~u0ðceet Þ ¼ ~bEtf½ð1 stþ1Þ~u0ðceetþ1Þ þ stþ1 ~u0ðceutþ1Þ ~Rtþ1g:
In Table 4 we report the standard deviation (st()) as well as the mean absolute value
(E½j  j) of the difference in annualised ex ante interest rates, that is
~dt  ðNtÞ4  ½EtðRtþ1Þ4:
Although we report those statistics for ~r ¼ rI ¼ 1 (third row of Table 4), we
emphasise here that our baseline utility function (36) is not comparable to a log utility
over [0, +∞); this is because our economy displays significantly more intertemporal
substituability (due to the linear portion of the utility function) than an economy with
a strictly concave utility function over [0, +∞). This leads us to compute ~dt for lower
values of ~r, holding rI = 1 unchanged. In all these experiments we adjust the subjective
discount factor ~b so that the mean of Ξt is the same as that generated by our model, R
.
That is, we set:
~b ¼ bI ~u0ðceeÞ=½ð1 sÞ~u0ðceeÞ þ s ~u0ðceuÞ
and report the corresponding value of ~b in Table 4 (second column).
Finally, for all the cases under study we also report Euler equation errors in terms of
proportional consumption difference, following Judd (1992). More specifically, using
the interest rate generated by our baseline model (i.e. Rt+1), we compute the current
consumption level consistent with the following Euler equation:
ð~ceet Þ~r ¼ ~bEtf½ð1 stþ1Þðceetþ1Þ~r þ s0tþ1ðceutþ1Þ~rRtþ1g;
where ~ceet is the implicit consumption level implied by a strictly concave utility function.
We then define
~et  ð~ceet  ceet Þ=ceet
and report stðj~et jÞ and Eðj~et jÞ in the last two columns of Table 4. Note that the value of ~b
that equates EðNtÞ and R also equates Eð~ceet Þ with cee.
Table 4 shows that Euler equation errors, when measured as proportional
consumption differences, are of the order of 1% and do not exceed 1.40%. When
measured as differences in the annualised interest rate, the distance between the Euler
equations strongly depends on the amount of curvature of the strictly concave utility
function ~uðÞ. For example, for ~r ¼ rI ¼ 1 the difference in the annualised interest has
a standard deviation of 6.30%, which is large. However, as explained above in this
situation the utility function with a linear part in fact generates much more
intertemporal substituability than a log utility function over [0, +∞); hence a
Table 4
Euler Equation Errors
Specification
Statistics (%)
~b stð ~dtÞ E½j ~dt j stð~etÞ E½j~et j
~r ¼ 1 0.972 4.73 3.77 1.14 0.91
~r ¼ 1=3 0.985 1.64 1.31 1.18 0.94
~r ¼ 0:1 0.988 0.58 0.46 1.40 1.12
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meaningful comparison between the two utility functions can only be made for lower
values of ~r, in which case the volatility of the interest rate difference is not necessarily
large (e.g. 0.58% for ~r ¼ 0:1).
4. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have proposed a tractable general equilibrium model of households’
behaviour under incomplete insurance and time-varying precautionary savings. We
have further gauged its ability to shed light on the dynamics of aggregate consumption
over the business cycle. In contrast to earlier attempts at constructing tractable versions
of models with heterogeneous agents, ours has two specific features. First, we provide a
realistic representation of households’ labour income risk, resulting from the
combined effects of persistent changes in the equilibrium real wage and the
probability of changing employment status. Second, we were able to reduce the
model’s dynamics to a small-scale system solved under rational expectations, thanks to
exact cross-household aggregation. We calibrate the model to match the broad
features of the cross-sectional wealth and consumption dispersions that are observed in
the US economy. We then feed it with joint productivity and labour market shocks.
Despite its simplicity the model does a fairly reasonable job at explaining the time-
series behaviour of aggregate consumption. In particular, comparison with the pure
‘hand-to-mouth’ model reveals that time-variations in precautionary savings may
significantly raise consumption volatility, even though the average individual wealth of
precautionary savers (as a share of aggregate liquid wealth) is very low. The flip side of
the coin concerns the behaviour of aggregate investment: because in our model the
precautionary motive is high during recessions and low during booms, the economy
with time-varying precautionary saving tends to display less investment volatility than
the representative-agent model. Smoother investment then translates in smoother
capital and output, so the latter turns out to be less volatile in our baseline economy
than in its representative-agent counterpart. This property, which we share with Krusell
and Smith (1998), suggests that incomplete insurance must be interacted with other
frictions to raise output volatility (relative to comparable complete-insurance econo-
mies), in addition to raising consumption volatility.
There are several directions of research that our tractable framework will allow us to
explore. A first natural direction is the consideration of other frictions (in addition to
incomplete insurance) that are widely believed to matter for the amplification and
propagation of business cycle shocks – notably labour-market search and nominal
rigidities. The key question here is whether or not those additional frictions can
improve on the main limitation of the basic single-friction model: the fact that in this
model time variations in precautionary savings exert a stabilising force on investment
fluctuations. Another area where this framework can be applied is that of international
interdependences. It is well known that in an open economy context incomplete
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks affects both trade and the pattern of capital
flows. Indeed, the demand for both foreign goods and foreign assets is affected by
precautionary savings. Our approach opens the way to the construction of a multi-
country analysis wherein the interactions between aggregate and idiosyncratic income
shocks can be investigated.
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